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Abstract The sensorimotor theory of perceptual experience claims that perception is
constituted by bodily interaction with the environment, drawing on practical knowledge of
the systematic ways that sensory inputs are disposed to change as a result of movement.
Despite the theory’s associations with enactivism, it is sometimes claimed that the appeal
to ‘knowledge’means that the theory is committed to giving an essential theoretical role to
internal representation, and therefore to a form of orthodox cognitive science. This paper
defends the role ascribed to knowledge by the theory, but argues that this knowledge can
and should be identified with bodily skill rather than representation. Making the further
argument that the notion of ‘representation hunger’ can be replaced with ‘prima facie
representation hunger’, it concludes that although the theory could optionally be devel-
oped scientifically in part by reference to internal representation, it makes a strong and
natural fit with anti-representationalist embodied or enactive cognitive science.
Keywords Enactivism . Sensorimotor theory. Sensorimotor contingencies . Perception .
Internal representation
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The sensorimotor theory (Hurley 1998; O’Regan and Noë 2001; Noë 2004; O’Regan
2011) is an unorthodox but increasingly influential approach to understanding percep-
tual consciousness. One important aspect of the theory is its account of phenomenal
character. It claims that the phenomenal qualities of perceptual experience are deter-
mined by and explicable by reference to sensorimotor contingencies (SMCs), the ways
that sensory inputs are disposed to systematically change in line with movement. SMCs
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are partly determined by sense organs, and O’Regan and Noë (2001, henceforth O&N)
propose that differences in the way e.g. eyes and ears determine SMCs accounts for
inter-modal phenomenal differences, e.g. between vision and audition. SMCs are also
determined by objects, and O&N propose that differences in the ways that objects with
differing e.g. shape or reflectance profile determine SMCs account for intra-modal
differences, e.g. between the looks of different colours.
Noë (2004) expands the notion of SMCs to include the ways that perspectival or ‘P’-
properties’ change in line with movement. A P-property is the way an object appears
from a given perspective, for example the elliptical aspect of a circular dinner plate
when faced at an angle. To see the plate as objectively circular is to see it as having the
tendency to appear as a more or less eccentric ellipse as the angle you face it from
changes. This explains how we experience objective properties even though we always
perceive the environment from a particular vantage point.
While SMCs help explain why an experience has one phenomenal character rather
than another, an account must also be given of how we come in the first place to have
perceptual experiences characterised by SMCs. This task is addressed by the sensori-
motor theory’s accompanying account of perception, which is the focus of this paper.
The theory purports to reject the orthodox scientific view, which following Marr
(1982), characterises perception as a process of internal representation by the brain of
the outside environment. O&N and Noë (2004) state that perception is instead the
possession and exercise of an embodied ‘mastery’ or highly implicit, practical (and not
propositional) knowledge of SMCs.
This view of perception is open to two quite distinct interpretations. On one
interpretation, a perceiver has sensorimotor knowledge by virtue of nothing other than
the possession of bodily abilities, and perception is nothing other than the possession
and exercise of these abilities. On this reading, the sensorimotor theory rejects the
orthodox view’s basic claim that perception is a process of internal representation.
On another interpretation, sensorimotor knowledge is an internal representation of
SMCs, and perception is the deployment of this representation, an activity that is
embodied only inasmuch as it is geared toward and causally enabled by bodily
interactions. On this reading, the sensorimotor theory accepts that perception is internal
representation, but rejects certain lines of thinking sometimes endorsed by orthodox
theories, for example that the representations in question are pictorial (e.g. Kosslyn
1994), or represent space as a set of co-ordinates (a view countered by Terekhov and
O’Regan 2013). On this latter reading, the theory is actively incompatible with ‘radical’
embodied or enactivist theories of perception and action (e.g. Gangopadhyay and
Kiverstein 2009; Chemero 2009, 2016; Hutto and Myin 2013) which set out to
dispense altogether with theoretical appeals to internal representation.
This uncertainty about the essential nature of sensorimotor perception is significant,
in part, because of the bearing it has on attempts to develop the sensorimotor approach
scientifically. A recent proposal by Seth (2014) offers a rendering of the sensorimotor
theory along very much orthodox lines, suggesting that perception consists of the
internal representation of SMCs by a predictive model. The theory has also been
developed in a representationalist register by Maye and Engel (e.g. 2016) who use a
representational implementation of sensorimotor knowledge in robot control architec-
tures. Others, however, such as Flament-Fultot (2016) and Buhrmann et al. (2013), have
developed the theory by appeal to entirely non-representational dynamical systems.
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While these differences reflect differing ideas about the most empirically fruitful way to
understand how sensorimotor perception is implemented, in so doing they also track
different understandings of the sensorimotor theory’s core commitments.
This paper will mainly focus on what McDowell (1994b) calls perception’s ‘con-
stitutive’ features, i.e. the features that are an essential part of what it is to perceive. If
the exercise of sensorimotor knowledge is the exercise of a bodily skill (i.e. ability), it is
not a process of internal representation, just as riding a bike is not a process of internal
representation, even though internal representations could play a role in enabling bike-
riding to take place. Conversely, if the exercise of sensorimotor knowledge is the
deployment of an internal representation, it is not the possession and exercise of a
bodily skill, even though it may enable and be enabled by various kinds of skillful
bodily interaction.
I will advocate a skill- rather than internal representation-based constitutive
account of sensorimotor knowledge, and so perception. The first part of the paper
will explain why we should be motivated in the first place to construe perception
as the possession and exercise of bodily skills. The next part of the paper will
explain how sensorimotor knowledge can be intelligibly construed as a bodily
skill rather than a kind of internal representation, and hence why the sensorimotor
theory is compatible with radical anti-representationalism. Finally, I will attempt
to clarify the uncertain role of internal representation in the sensorimotor theory
by setting out limited respects in which theoretical appeals to internal representa-
tion are admissible, although not essential, in developing the sensorimotor
approach.
2
Let’s begin by seeing what motivations there are for construing perception as the
possession and exercise of bodily skills, and so endorsing what I will refer to as the
‘skill-based’ view of perception.
2.1
One important reason to endorse the skill-based view is that it offers the best way
to explain the visual feeling of presence of a richly and uniformly detailed scene.
The retinal image does not at any given instant contain rich and uniform detail,
and work on phenomena such as change blindness (e.g. O’Regan et al. 1999) has
suggested that the brain probably does not build up a richly detailed inner model
to compensate. However, as O’Regan (1992) among others has emphasised,
perceivers access detail directly from the environment by making constant use
of exploratory bodily movements such as saccades, and the body is poised to re-
orient the eyes toward sudden changes in stimulation occurring at the low-
resolution periphery of the retina (this is called ‘grabbiness’ e.g. by O&N). Thus
he makes the compelling suggestion that we access detail directly from the
environment, when required, in a serial fashion.
Dennett (2002) argues that visual experience does not really present rich detail, and
that the ability to interrogate the environment in the way described causes perceivers to
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be standardly under the grip of a ‘grand illusion’, falsely believing their own visual
experiences to be much richer in detail than they really are. This is analogous to
thinking the refrigerator light is always on because it is on whenever you open the
door to look (O&N). On this proposal, bodily skill accounts for the false belief that
perception is rich, while perception itself may be constituted by nothing other than
internal representation.
Noë (2002) endorses O’Regan’s (1992) suggestion that bodily skill explains
why visual experience seems to present rich and uniform detail. Instead of
claiming that this is an illusion, however, he argues that visual experience really
does present rich detail. He claims that the experience of richness is not consti-
tuted by internal representation, but by the detail’s accessibility, i.e. its readiness
to be accessed using skillful movements. This proposal has a significant advan-
tage, namely that it is more parsimonious, since it does not require us to suppose
that perceivers are as standard radically deceived about the nature of their own
experiences. Importantly, however, it requires us to conceive of the sensorimotor
skills we use to access detail as constitutive of visual experience rather than mere
causal scaffolding.
The phenomenology of richness therefore offers a powerful reason for thinking that
perception is at least partly constituted by bodily skills. This does not preclude the
possibility that sensorimotor knowledge is an internal representation, and perception
the deployment of this representation plus the exercise of bodily skills. The reasons I
give next for endorsing the skill-based view will call on us to take sensorimotor
knowledge itself to consist of bodily ability.
2.2
Another important reason to endorse the skill-based view is to help secure the
philosophical thesis of direct realism. Direct realism claims that to perceive is to
come into direct and unmediated epistemic contact with the objects in the envi-
ronment rather than with representations of them (e.g. McDowell 1994a, b).
Although it is contentious, direct realism has the crucial advantage of according
with perceptual phenomenology, which feels direct and unmediated. This is an
important reason to endorse direct realism, provided the thesis can be shown in
other respects to be sufficiently plausible.
Beaton (2016) has compellingly argued that the skill-based view of perception can
be considered a scientifically-tractable accompaniment to direct realism, given that
exercising a bodily skill is itself a way of interacting in a direct and unmediated way
with the outside environment. Whereas the orthodox scientific view of perception does
nothing to support direct realism, the skill-based view, Beaton notes, lends direct
realism scientific credentials and has the advantage of doing justice to the phenome-
nology of directness which motivates it.
The sensorimotor theory also offers some reasons of its own to endorse direct
realism. As I explained in the last passage, the skill-based view is partly motivated
by the phenomenology of richness. To further enrich the story, we can observe that this
phenomenology also helps motivate direct realism. The idea that there is a grand
illusion is persuasive if you subscribe to the indirect realist thesis that one’s perceptual
access to the world is mediated by a representation, since such a representation would
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probably be sparse in detail. If you are an indirect realist, you therefore come under
pressure to accept the unparsimonious thesis that our beliefs about what our perceptual
experiences are like accord with what the world is like, but not with what our
perceptual experiences are really like.1
Noë’s account of richness is compelling because it hints at a simpler explanation: we
have the visual experience of being situated within a richly detailed environment
because being in an appropriate way situated is just what vision consists of. This is a
direct realist claim. Hence the skill-based account of visual richness supports direct
realism, and direct realism in turn supports a skill-based account of the entirety of visual
experience (as argued by Beaton 2013, 2016).
A final reason to endorse direct realism is derived from the sensorimotor theory’s
broad claim that perceptual experience depends on mastering patterns of sensorimotor
contingency. Noë (2008) grants that the theory must account for the fact that perceptual
experience seems to present what Campbell describes as the Bordinary world, there
independent of us^ (Campbell 2008, p. 667) as opposed merely to counterfactual
consequences of possible movement. To this end, Noë denies that sensorimotor
contingencies are the objects of perception, claiming instead that we perceive the
ordinary world by mastering SMCs.
To pursue this solution, a version of the sensorimotor theory which claimed that
perceptual experience is mediated by a representation would need, I suggest, to propose
that we use sensorimotor knowledge (whether construed as representation or skill) to
construct a separate representation of the ordinary world, since it could only
explain how we perceptually experience the world as a world of ordinary
objects by appealing to the deployment of such a representation. According
to Noë’s more elegant proposal, experiencing the ordinary world does not
require this extra step, since exercising sensorimotor knowledge is enough by
itself to put us in direct perceptual contact with the ordinary world. We can
explain how sensorimotor knowledge does this by positing, as just suggested,
that sensorimotor knowledge is a bodily skill used to interact in an unmediated
way with the outside environment.
2.3
One final reason to adopt the skill-based view of perception is that, on account of
avoiding a serious shortcoming with representationalist accounts of phenomenal qual-
ity, it offers a better way to naturalise the phenomenal qualities of perceptual
consciousness.
1 I am taking it that visual experiences do indeed seem to present a large and uniformly detailed visual scene,
i.e. that we believe they present such a scene. This is supported by the surprise expressed by subjects in change
blindness and inattentional blindness experiments upon discovering that they have missed unusual occurrences
taking place in full view (see Dennett 2002). Dennett claims that this belief is illusory. The sensorimotor
theory, on a skill-based interpretation, can claim that the belief is correct, since presence is not representation
but accessibility. An indirect realist could avoid the claim that there is a grand illusion by denying that we have
any such belief. To account for the surprise, she could say that subjects correctly believe that detail is usually
accessible using bodily skill, but deny that this accessibility is a kind of perceptual presence, hence a
constitutive part of visual experience. However it is, I believe, phenomenologically more apt to claim that
momentary perceptual experiences do seem like they present a large and uniformly detailed scene.
Skill and representation in sensorimotor perception
The problemwith internal representation, in short, is the absence of a satisfactory way
to naturalise content i.e. truth conditions.2 Hutto and Myin (2013, henceforth H&M)
observe that the leading attempts to naturalise content (e.g. Dretske 1981; Millikan
1989) depend on the idea that standing in a co-variance relation with something is
identical to bearing content about it, at least when certain conditions are met. And as
they comment, co-variance by default does not constitute content - for instance, a tree’s
rings do not strictly speaking bear truth conditions about the tree’s age - and the burden
of proof is therefore on the theorist intending to show that in certain cases it does.
The problem, as H&M argue, is that nothing has yet been done to adequately meet
this burden, either by appealing solely to particular types of co-variance or to co-
variance with the addition of further theoretical apparatuses. Millikan (1989), for
example, appeals to the proper function brains have of possessing and making appro-
priate use of co-variance relations. However, this merely shows that brains have the
function of exploiting patterns of co-variance with the environment and does not
establish that they bear content about it. H&M conclude that cognitive scientific
accounts of action and perception should dispense altogether with the idea of content
and consequently representation.
I will not argue for the radical conclusion that H&M do, since even though truth
conditions have not so far been naturalised, many proponents of what H&M call
‘content involving cognition’ have plausible rationales for appealing to representation
or content that do not depend on doing so. One approach is simply to stipulate that
covariance of a certain kind constitutes content (e.g. Rupert 2011). This entails deflating
the notion of content so that all we mean by content is such a relation. It can be granted
that the brain makes use of certain covariance relations for producing behaviour.
An alternative approach accepts that content consists of truth conditions, but treats
these as a kind of explanatory fiction (e.g. McDowell 1994b; Sprevak 2013; Egan
2014). For the sake of argument, we can grant that physical states sometimes interact
with one another to produce behaviour in a way that can best be predicted or made
intelligible by reference to the fact that they are interacting as if they were contentful
representations.
Representationalism about phenomenal qualities (e.g. Tye 2000), however, has a
distinctive explanatory aim, namely to render unmysterious the phenomenal properties
often considered to be irreducible or even non-physical ‘qualia’. Borrowing from
orthodox perception science the assumption that perception consists of internal (e.g.
neural) representation, this variety of representationalism proposes that phenomenal
qualities such as the looks of colours can be reduced to the content of the representations
that yield the experience. In so doing, representationalists like Tye take themselves to be
appealing to the genuine existence of internally (e.g. neurally) borne truth conditions.
The problem is that this kind of representationalism, though it may adequately
reduce phenomenal properties to content, makes no useful progress toward convinc-
ingly identifying truth conditions with types of physical relation. While naturalising
truth conditions is not necessarily important for the scientific project of explaining
behaviour (including perceptually-guided behaviour, reports of visual experience, etc.)
in representational terms, it is essential to the more philosophical project of using
representation to naturalise qualia.
2 In this passage, ‘truth conditions’will be used for the sake of brevity to mean ‘truth and/or correctness conditions’.
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We might entertain that representationalism about phenomenal qualities could make
use of the stipulative or fictionalist views of content just described. The problem is that
attempts to account naturalistically for the intentional directedness and phenomenal
character of perceptual experience are subject to greater constraints than attempts to
explain behaviour. Identifying phenomenal qualities directly with features of the brain,
representationalists agree, would not render phenomenal qualities unmysterious, so
stipulating that content is merely a kind of brain state will not help.
Moreover, we cannot reduce phenomenal qualities to content if that content is
fictional, since this would amount to reducing the qualities to something non-existent.
One might point out that fictional content does exist, in the sense in which Sherlock
Holmes exists. Even if we grant this, it will only entail that content exists relative to a
theoretical model, and not that it exists from the point of view of a conscious subject.
And it is precisely the qualities featured in the first-person experience of the conscious
subject that we are trying to identify with something physically-realisable. So repre-
sentational content will not help account for perceptual phenomenology unless it is
‘real’ in a more robust sense than has yet been convincingly established.
Bodily skills, by contrast, are not explanatory fictions. Their exercise can be
straightforwardly observed in the behaviour of perceiving subjects. The shortcomings
of attempts to naturalise subpersonal representational content therefore offer another
reason to endorse the view that sensorimotor knowledge consists of bodily skills.
3
The considerations just outlined give us good reason to construe perception as the
possession and exercise of bodily abilities. Since we are taking it that perception is the
possession and exercise of sensorimotor knowledge, we therefore have good reason to
construe sensorimotor knowledge as bodily ability. O’Regan and Noë (2001) accord-
ingly describe sensorimotor knowledge as a variety of practical knowledge (i.e.
knowledge-how) and, expanding upon this point, Noë (2004, 2005, 2014) argues,
contra Stanley and Williamson (2001), that practical knowledge in general consists of
ability (being able to perform an action) and not propositional knowledge (knowing
that such-and-such a movement is the way an action is performed). In what follows, I
will assume that Noë’s arguments against Stanley and Williamson are correct.
Here, however, we meet a problem: namely that this characterisation of sensorimotor
knowledge is in tension with the sensorimotor theory’s compelling account of phe-
nomenal qualities. O’Regan and Noë claim that phenomenal qualities of perceptual
experience, e.g. the looks of colours, are determined by properties which can be
specified by counterfactual conditionals, namely the sensory changes that would occur
if certain movements took place. To explain how we come to have perceptual experi-
ence determined by SMCs, the authors claim that we exercise Bpractical knowledge of
the effect movement will have on nervous influx^ (pp. 970–971). But this claim seems
incoherent. The object of knowledge-how must be a doing (e.g. knowing how to ride a
bike) and the sensory changes that would occur as a result of possible movements are
not doings. The upshot, on the face of it, is that we can either construe sensorimotor
knowledge as practical but not counterfactual, or counterfactual but not practical, but
not both. And we will now see that neither option is satisfactory.
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Suppose that sensorimotor knowledge is practical but not counterfactual. This would
mean that perception is constitutively dependent solely on abilities to perform bodily
actions of one kind or another. In consequence, there would be no obvious way to make
it intelligible that the phenomenal character of perception is determined by sensory
changes that would occur as a result of merely possible movements, and we would need
an alternative way to explain how bodily interactions determine the phenomenal
character of perceptual experience. Alternative principles are available, but have
important shortcomings.
According to one available alternative, phenomenal qualities are determined entirely
by the sensory changes that are now occurring as a result of presently ongoing
movements. However, this suggestion fails to accommodate one of the sensorimotor
theory’s most prominent explananda, namely the perceptually experienced presence ‘in
absence’ of hidden or occluded features of the perceived scene (e.g. Noë 2004;
O’Regan 2011). Noë observes, for instance, that only one side of a tomato or
other opaque object can be seen at any one time, and yet that it does not
typically feel as if you are looking at a mere tomato facade. The tomato’s
hidden side is perceptually present as absent, he suggests, because you appre-
ciate that certain movements would result in the hidden side coming into view.
Importantly, this experience only requires that you look at the tomato: you do
not have to actually interact with the tomato’s hidden side. The experience
therefore cannot be accounted for by the sensory changes taking place as a
result of presently occurring movements.
According to another available principle, the phenomenal character of perceptual
experience is determined by possibilities for action, e.g. affordances of the sort
described by Gibsonian accounts (for recent examples see Chemero 2009, Rietveld
and Kiverstein 2014). By adopting this principle we could explain perceptual
presence, including presence in absence, by appeal to your knowing how to
make use of action possibilities, including the possibility of interacting with the
tomato’s hidden side. However, while it is beyond the scope of this paper to
give a detailed comparison of SMCs-based and affordance-based accounts of
perceptual phenomenology, I wish to highlight one important apparent short-
coming with this proposal.
Subjects in experiments using left-right inverting goggles, upon first putting the
goggles on, are unable to see and behave as normal, but after an extended period of
adaptation are able once again to effectively co-ordinate their bodily movements.
Reports vary, but many suggest that visual phenomenology remains inverted even after
adaptation (see, e.g., Klein 2007, Degenaar 2014).3 The sensorimotor theory, appro-
priately understood, can accommodate this straightforwardly by noting that putting on
the goggles changes the SMCs that presently obtain, and that they remain
changed whether or not the subject is adapted to them. The affordance-based
approach cannot accommodate the inverted phenomenology, because the
adapted goggle-wearer makes use of the same possibilities for action she made
use of while not wearing the goggles.
3 Degenaar’s view, based on his own first-hand experience with inverting goggles, is that perceptual
experience has an intentional component which re-inverts after adaptation to the goggles, and a distinct
phenomenal component which does not.
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Given that there are important drawbacks to supposing that sensorimotor knowledge
is practical but not counterfactual, let us suppose that it is counterfactual but not
practical. The task, if we adopt this construal, is to explain what sensorimotor knowl-
edge consists of. The most obvious proposal, consistent with orthodox perception
science, is that it is a variety of propositional knowledge and consists of internal
representation. Conversely, it is hard to see how it could consist of ability, because
an ability, if a kind of knowledge, must be knowledge-how. The problem, of course, is
that we are attempting to avoid a conception in which perception is constitutively
dependent on internal representation. This makes it hard to give any positive charac-
terisation of sensorimotor knowledge.
This dilemma will seem even more acute if we endorse Noë’s claim that sensori-
motor knowledge is Bthe ground of your possession of dispositions to respond to the
presented object^ (Noë 2004, p. 88). If H&M’s interpretation is correct, this positively
rules out the possibility that sensorimotor knowledge is itself a disposition (or ability).
They say:
Whereas the endorsement of representationalism is coherent but costly, without
that commitment there appears to be no way to specify in positive terms what
kind of thing … [sensorimotor] knowledge is meant to be, given that it is not
merely embodied in dispositions of organisms but is supposed to form the ground
for such dispositions. (H&M, p. 26)
Thus it is hard to give a positive characterisation of sensorimotor knowledge as
counterfactual but not practical without construing it as an internal representation, and
even harder if we also accept the suggestion that sensorimotor knowledge, being a
ground, is not embodied in the dispositions of organisms. I believe that it is right to
view sensorimotor knowledge, being counterfactual, as a ground of bodily abilities,
because various bodily abilities require you to appreciate the sensory consequences of
possible movement. However this need not, as it first appears, require denying that
sensorimotor knowledge is a kind of practical knowledge, embodied in the dispositions
(or, more aptly, abilities) of perceiving subjects. The next section will explain how it
can after all be so-understood.
4
Sensorimotor knowledge consists, I propose, of the ability to act in a way that is
sensitive to the SMCs that presently obtain. A subject could not logically be said to
have sensorimotor knowledge, on this view, if she did not have abilities to perform
various bodily actions. However, sensorimotor knowledge is not identical to such
abilities either. While knowledge of how to perform a particular action, such as ride a
bike, is individuated by a behavioural intention, sensorimotor knowledge is individu-
ated by SMCs to which the subject is sensitive when she acts.
Sensorimotor knowledge is a condition of possibility for most action abilities: for
example, you would not be able to catch a ball if you were not able to act in a way that
is sensitive to the changes in sensory stimulation that movement by the ball or changes
to your own bodily positioning will produce. In this sense, sensorimotor knowledge can
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rightly be said to ‘ground’ many action abilities. This does not mean, however, that
sensorimotor knowledge is something other than a bodily ability, such as an internal
representation: it is, rather, an ability which grounds other abilities.
It is necessary to distinguish between sensorimotor knowledge and the differently,
usually more narrowly, individuated action abilities it grounds because it is sensorimo-
tor knowledge that accounts for perceptual phenomenology. Two subjects could have
differing sets of action abilities and goals while sharing identical sensorimotor knowl-
edge, and the sensorimotor theory, as presently understood, predicts that sameness of
perceptual phenomenology requires sameness of sensorimotor knowledge and not
sameness of ability or inclination to carry out specific goal-directed actions.
If we adopt this characterisation of sensorimotor knowledge, the sensorimotor theory
agrees with H&M and Chemero (2016) that perceptual ability is not constituted by
internal representation. Those authors also object to the very idea that perception
requires ‘knowledge’, deeming this unacceptably intellectualist. This issue, though
not trivial, does not have a material bearing on the points made so far: those persuaded,
for instance, by Noë (2004, 2012) remarks defending the idea that perceptual abilities
are a kind of practical knowledge or understanding can read the present treatment as a
gloss on the faculty he describes. Those moved by anti-intellectualist considerations to
deny that perception requires any kind of knowledge might prefer to expunge all
references to knowledge and give the ability in question an alternative label such as
sensorimotor ‘attunement’.
My position, for what it’s worth, is that the ability in question deserves to be
described as ‘knowledge’ in adult humans and any other subjects that are able to have
thoughts which express knowledge about what they perceive. Qua knowledge, the
ability is both knowing how to act with the relevant sensitivity, and, in a highly implicit
sense, knowing that certain SMCs apply. To know that you are seeing, for example, a
cube, you must know, at least implicitly, that your relationship with the environment is
governed by the SMCs characteristic of seeing cubes, since your belief that you are
seeing a cube would otherwise lack justification. Someone could be said to have this
knowledge by virtue of being able to recognise and report cases in which an object’s
appearance does not vary in line with movement in the way expected.
Supposing, as seems plausible, that knowing what you perceive is an essential
feature of the kind of perception enacted by adult humans, this kind of perception
itself requires knowledge of SMCs. Appealing here to thought does not mean appealing
to internal representation as long as we consider thought itself to be constituted by a
relation a practically-skilled subject stands in to the environment, as Noë (2012) for
instance proposes, rather than the disembodied manipulation of mental representations.
On the other hand, sensorimotor ‘attunement’ better describes perceptual ability in
subjects that fail to integrate their perceptual skills with capacities for thought, includ-
ing (conceivably) machines, infants, animals and even more basic organisms, all of
whom may nonetheless perform actions (construed, in an undemanding sense, as
purposeful doings) that exhibit a sensitivity to SMCs.
Our account of sensorimotor knowledge or attunement will need to appropriately
accommodate the phenomenological claim, mentioned in the last section, that hidden or
occluded features of the environment can enjoy perceptual presence in absence. If the
phenomenological description given by Noë (2004) is correct, merely looking at a
tomato is enough to visually experience the presence in absence of its hidden side. On a
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representationalist construal of sensorimotor knowledge, one could account for this by
suggesting that the perceiver’s brain represents the sensory consequences that would
occur if she were, say, to turn the tomato around. On the present construal of
sensorimotor knowledge, the case requires some further explanation, bearing in mind
that a perceiver does not necessarily overtly exhibit a sensitivity to the tomato’s hidden
side when she looks at the tomato.
Consider O’Regan and Noë’s (2001) example of a guided-missile pursuing a plane.
Suppose that the missile’s goal is to keep the plane aligned in the centre of its sensor
and that when the target instead appears toward one edge of the sensor, the missile
makes the movements required to re-align the target in the centre.4 Given a suitable
assumption about what the missile’s goal is, one could observe in this behaviour an
overt sensitivity to the sensory consequence that will occur if it makes this movement.
When the plane appears in the centre of the missile’s sensor, the missile makes no
corrective movements. Considering this event in isolation, there is nothing to distin-
guish the missile from a different missile that has been programmed to maintain its
course regardless of its sensor state. Yet the original missile is nonetheless exercising its
sensorimotor attunement by not changing course, because it is making use of its
sensitivity to the fact that changing its course would result in it no longer achieving
its goal of keeping the plane aligned in the centre of the sensor.
Similarly, you may look at a tomato but lack any intention to pick it up, turn it around,
and so forth. By analogy with the missile that merely maintains its course, it would not
be incoherent to take it that you are nonetheless making use, in an entirely implicit way,
of your full repertoire of sensorimotor knowledge. This could be captured by broad
principles such as Bpicking up the tomato would not result in my achieving my present
behavioural goal^ but also narrower principles describing, for instance, the ways the
stimulation you will receive from the tomato will vary as you turn it around. The
proposal that you are always making implicit use of all your sensorimotor knowledge
allows us to adequately account for the phenomenology of presence in absence.
5
I have now established, I hope, that sensorimotor knowledge can and should be under-
stood as a variety of bodily skill. Let’s now consider what theoretical role for internal
representationmay remain, given the version of the sensorimotor theory I have advocated.
The thesis that perception is wholly or partly constituted by internal representation - call
this ‘constitutive representationalism’ - is featured in the indirect realist view of perception
(see, Snowdon 1992) and also in cognitive science as the view, tacit or otherwise, that
perception and other cognitive processes depend on internal representation as a matter of
conceptual necessity or even definition. The cognitive scientific version is identified and
rejected, for instance, by Ramsey (2015) and Noë (2004). In the characterisation I have
given, bodily abilities are sufficient for sensorimotor knowledge, so we have rejected an
important motivation for constitutive representationalism.
4 It is worth noting, as an anoymous reviewer points out, that in reality a guided-missile should aim toward
where the target is going to be, based on its present trajectory, rather than where it is now. But a simplified
description of a guided missile’s behaviour will do for present purposes.
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Recall that McDowell (1994b) contrasts constitutive features with ‘enabling’ features.
To ‘enable’ perception is to play a causal role in perception, in particular one where the
cause takes place simultaneous to the effect but at a different explanatory level. ‘Enabling
representationalism’, as we might call it, claims that perception is enabled by the
subpersonal deployment of internal representations. You can deny that perception is a
kind of internal representation without necessarily denying that it so-enabled. So it would
not compromise the skill-based view to allow that perception might involve subpersonal
representations. Notice how the skill-based view, by this light, inverts the usual order of
priority, in which cognition is thought to be constituted by internal representation and
merely enabled by bodily interactions (Adams and Aizawa 2001, cf. Hurley 2010).
Here, however, things get a little more complicated. McDowell would reject con-
stitutive representationalism even if representational explanation at the subpersonal
level were indispensable, because he takes perception necessarily to be a personal-level
(or agent-level) activity. But this move requires signing up to McDowell’s own
particular view of the mind, and sensorimotor theorists are not required to accept it
(Noë 2004, for instance, doubts that there is a useful personal/subpersonal distinction to
be made). If we cannot rely on the personal/subpersonal distinction to distinguish
constitutive representationalism from enabling representationalism, then we must rely
on the distinction between the necessary and the contingent, where constitutive repre-
sentationalism takes perception to be necessarily representational and enabling repre-
sentationalism takes it to only be contingently representational.
The case of presence in absence, illustrated by the tomato example, shows that
perception involves responsiveness to absent features. Clark and Toribio (1994) argue
that cases of perception and action like this are subject to ‘representation hunger’, meaning
they could not intelligibly occur unless there was internal representation. If perception is
subject to representation hunger, constitutive representationalism is correct.
Constitutive representationalism in turn compromises the skill-based view, since if
the bodily skills deployed in perception require internal representation, then we must
understand sensorimotor knowledge as an internal representation, and this gives us
reason to think that the bodily skills that the internal representation enables are
contingent rather than constitutive features of perception. As we have seen, there are
independent reasons (e.g. direct realism) for endorsing a skill-based view of perception
which do not derive from the nature of sensorimotor knowledge. But if our conception
of sensorimotor knowledge entails that perception is subject to representation hunger, it
makes the skill-based view less plausible rather than lending it support.
I wish to maintain that sensorimotor knowledge is not constituted by internal
representation. To establish this, we need not rely on McDowell’s claim that perception
is necessarily an agent-level phenomenon. Nor need we deny that perceptual experi-
ence has characteristics, such as presence in absence, that make it appear subject to
representation hunger. Instead of taking these characteristics to imply representation
hunger, we should take them merely to imply what we could think of as prima facie
representation hunger. Prima facie representation hunger does not entail that internal
representation is theoretically indispensable, merely that there is theoretical work to be
done that could be done by internal representation.5
5 For a rebuttal of the notion of representation hunger, see also Degenaar and Myin (2014).
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To see that sensorimotor knowledge merely entails prima facie representation
hunger, and not representation hunger proper, consider that there are non-
representational ways that sensorimotor knowledge could be implemented. These are
explored by Flament-Fultot (2016), who proposes that we appeal to synergies found in
complex systems. Crucially, his proposal does not abandon the idea that features with
which we are not in sensory contact can enjoy presence in absence. Instead, it accounts
for presence in absence by appeal to behavioural intentions we have toward such
features, which can be explicated without appeal to internal representation.
Flament-Fultot gives the analogy of a coiled spring. The spring’s future behaviour is
determined by presently instantiated properties such as its stiffness, and changes in its
present stiffness mean changes in its behavioural propensities. His suggestion is that
one’s behavioural intentions toward the back of a tomato depend on properties analo-
gous to stiffness, which do not require representational content. Although the version of
the sensorimotor theory I have recommended does not account for the phenomenal
character of perceptual experience by reference to particular behavioural intentions, e.g.
the intention to interact in a particular way with a tomato, it does do so by reference to
an ability to act with sensitivity of obtaining SMCs embodied in our intentional
behaviour. So Flament-Fultot’s appeal to properties analogous to stiffness has the
potential to show how sensorimotor knowledge is implemented.
The point I want to emphasise at present is that the sensorimotor theory rejects
constitutive representationalism. To this end, it does not in principle matter whether
perception does or does not happen to be enabled by the deployment of internal
representations. So long as it is true that perception as construed by the sensorimotor
theory does not necessarily draw on internal representation, we can be assured that the
sensorimotor theory actively rejects constitutive representationalism.
One reason this matters is that it secures the sensorimotor theory’s credentials as a
scientific complement to direct realism. McDowell’s argument shows that direct
realism is not ruled out by the suggestion that perception makes use of internal
representations, since internal representations may be recruited by the processes we
use to directly encounter the outside environment. However, indirect realism says that
perception is necessarily mediated by an internal representation. Once we understand
the sensorimotor theory to actively reject constitutive representationalism, we see that,
in contrast with the orthodox view of perception, the sensorimotor theory is actively
incompatible with indirect realism, and this secures its status as a scientifically-tractable
version of direct realism. Rejecting constitutive representationalism also means that the
sensorimotor theory is compatible with ‘radical’ non-representationalism and therefore
could be scientifically developed in a non-representationalist framework.
6
In the introduction, I mentioned that the constitutive account we give of sensorimotor
perception will have a bearing on how the sensorimotor approach should be developed
scientifically. One consequence of adopting a wholly skill-based constitutive account,
as I have aimed to show in the last section, is that sensorimotor perception could be
implemented without internal representation, though it need not be. This might be
considered of little consequence for accounts that do refer to internal representation to
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explain how sensorimotor perception occurs. Let me explain now how it does have
some bearing, using Seth’s (2014) treatment of the sensorimotor approach as a case
study to illustrate some points that are also potentially applicable to other representa-
tionalist renderings of the theory.
Seth takes perceptual phenomenology to be determined not only by present senso-
rimotor activity but, as I have indeed suggested here, by SMCs construed in counter-
factual terms. Adopting a predictive coding framework, he operationalises sensorimotor
knowledge by identifying it with generative models containing predictions about the
sensory changes that would follow from movement. Since Seth does not make use of
the distinction between constitutive and enabling features of perception, or anything
closely related, it is hard to tell if he takes perception to be identical to the deployment
of these models or if he would allow that perception is a kind of skillful interaction with
the environment, which the generative models he describes merely help implement.
What I shall claim, in either case, is that it would be a mistake to treat the generative
models Seth describes as if they were the whole story, even if we set to one side the
distinctively philosophical considerations concerning qualia and direct realism
discussed in section 2.
One of Seth’s main claims is that sensorimotor knowledge can usefully explain a
feature of grapheme-colour synaesthesia in which seeing words induces a non-veridical
experience of colour. The colour experience induced by this kind of synaesthesia lacks
what Seth calls ‘subjective veridicality’, meaning that the colour does not appear to the
subject to be a genuine property of the outside world. Subjective veridicality is the
result, he proposes, of ‘counterfactually-rich’ generative models, i.e. models
representing a sufficiently large range of SMCs, and it is the failure to represent a
sufficiently large range that distinguishes synaesthesia-induced colour experience.
Notice that the difference between ordinary and synaesthesia-induced colour expe-
rience could be accounted in the way suggested by Seth whether we take perception to
be constituted by a predictive model, or take it to be constituted by bodily abilities -
themselves instantiating counterfactually-rich sensorimotor knowledge - that are merely
enabled by generative models. There are, however, other features of perceptual phe-
nomenology that are better addressed if we adopt the latter view. Some of these, such as
the phenomenal difference between sensory perception and inner senses such as
interoception are mentioned by O’Regan and Degenaar (2014).
Right now, let’s return to the visual presence of an expansive and uniformly detailed
environment, as discussed in section 2. It is notable that this aspect of visual phenom-
enology is itself distinguished, as Seth claims subjective veridicality is, by a high level of
counterfactual richness. Though you are not presently in sensory contact with uniform
detail from an expansive visual scene, you visually experience the presence of an
environment containing a rich multitude of possibilities for movement and associated
sensory consequences. It is doubtful, even within the predictive coding framework, that
the brain makes uniformly detailed predictions about all of these, in particular those
sensed far into the retinal periphery, so an account which takes perception to be
constituted by generative models is likely to be confronted by a hard to explain disparity
between the relative sparseness of the predictions and relative richness of the visual
world that experience apparently presents us with. The skill-based approach, as we have
seen, can explain the phenomenology in question by reference to relatively sparse
sensorimotor knowledge applied within a rich and stable external environment.
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Returning to Seth’s account, it is conceivably true that counterfactual richness
accounts for subjective veridicality. In this event, it should be recognised that this is
in the first instance a fact about the phenomenology of perceptual experience - an
experience feels veridical because it feels counterfactually rich. The question of how an
experience so-characterised occurs is secondary, and is at least in some cases better
answered by reference to bodily ability than generative models. Seth’s treatment is a
useful hypothesis about the implementational details of sensorimotor perception, but
must be read in this light. The possibility of accounting for perceptual phenomena by
reference to non-representational and/or extra-bodily features should not be closed off
by conflating the treatment with a constitutive account of what it is to perceive.
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The sensorimotor theory is sometimes presented as if it were essentially as a variety of
orthodox cognitive science and at other times essentially as a ‘radical’ embodied or
enactive theory. I claim that there are certain key principles that any version of the
sensorimotor theory should be committed to and which delimit the approach as a
substantive theory and not just a loose collection of intersecting claims. These princi-
ples are compatible with varying attempts to develop the theory scientifically, both with
and without internal representation, but they do shape in important ways the manner in
which the theory should be scientifically cashed out.
Considerations concerning the phenomenology of richness, direct realism, and
phenomenal qualities suggest that perception is constituted by the possession and
exercise of bodily abilities rather than a process of internal representation. Although
we need the notion of ‘sensorimotor knowledge’, or at least something closely related
such as ‘sensorimotor attunement’, we can understand this as bodily ability rather than
an internal representation. On this construal the theory is not guilty, as radical
enactivists worry, of being committed to internal representation, but in fact becomes
a natural ally of anti-representationalist cognitive science.
A worry remains that the understanding of sensorimotor knowledge on offer none-
theless entails that perception is subject to representation hunger, meaning it depends
subpersonally on internal representation. Since the sensorimotor theory does not
necessarily endorse McDowell’s use of the personal/subpersonal distinction, we cannot
rely on this distinction to establish that perception is not constitutively representational
and must instead rely on the necessary/contingent distinction. The danger is that
representation hunger means that representation is necessary, and therefore that per-
ception is constitutively representational. However, I suggest that perception is only
subject to prima facie representation hunger, since there are non-representational (e.g
dynamical systems) accounts available that could do the explanatory work that would
otherwise have been done by internal representation. The availability of such ap-
proaches is enough to show that perception as construed by the sensorimotor theory
is not constitutively representational.
The sensorimotor theory may be developed in a way that appeals to internal
representation, so long as it is agreed that internal representation is not essential but
is used merely as an explanatory tool to show how the sensorimotor skills of which
perception consists are contingently enabled. On this view, the epistemic access
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perception gives us to the world and the phenomenal quality of perceptual experience
must be accounted for by reference to the possession and exercise of bodily skills rather
than internal representation. Moreover, the possibility remains that the sensorimotor
theory be developed scientifically in an entirely non-representationalist register.
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